Neither the reverse proxy nor a production Next server logs requests, so
"is the device on TLS?" was not answerable without a packet capture —
and the capture then produced nothing, because tcpdump buffers its
output and a handful of SYN lines never filled the buffer.
One line per wake, naming the scheme and saying so plainly when the
panel is being served in clear. At a two-hour refresh that is a dozen
lines a day, and it turns a question that cost an evening into a grep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
The panel's HTTP client does not follow redirects. It asks for
/api/setup/ with a trailing slash, Next answered 308 to normalise it,
and the firmware reported "returned code is not OK. Code - 308" and gave
up. Never having obtained a token, it then called /api/display with an
empty one, got 401, and told the user it could not reach the API.
Not TLS, not the network, not the port — a slash. Two earlier fixes were
aimed at hypotheses the evidence did not support: a certificate chain
the firmware genuinely cannot validate, and a port the shop's network
turned out not to block. Both were reasoned from silence, because
neither Traefik nor a production Next server logs requests by default.
The answer came from a packet capture, and from the device's own words.
/api/log now accepts a report from a panel that cannot authenticate.
Refusing it with a 401 threw away the one diagnostic that mattered: the
firmware was saying exactly what was wrong and we were discarding the
message. Nothing is stored — the rows would reference a device that does
not exist — but it reaches the server log, and the route was already
rate-limited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
The e-ink firmware carries a certificate-authority bundle fixed when it
was built, so it cannot validate a chain rooted in an authority created
afterwards. Let's Encrypt's ISRG Root YR was issued in May 2026 and is
not even in an up-to-date Ubuntu CA bundle yet; the kit's firmware
predates it. The handshake fails before a request is ever sent, which is
why neither Traefik nor the application saw anything at all while the
device reported "API connection cannot be established".
Ruled out first, with evidence: TLS 1.2 and the ECDHE-RSA-AES-GCM suites
an ESP32 needs are both offered, and the intermediate is not
cross-signed by an older root, so no alternate path exists in what is
served.
A Traefik router now serves four device paths over :80, ahead of the
entrypoint-wide redirect. The administration stays on TLS. The device
token travels in clear; it is used for nothing else and is revocable
from the settings page, and the image URL is an unguessable content hash.
DEVICE_ALLOW_HTTP existed but was never read — a setting that does
nothing misrepresents what it protects. The device routes now refuse an
unencrypted request unless it is set, so opening this door is a written
decision rather than the silent consequence of a proxy change.
DEPLOY.md records the whole diagnosis, including the commands that
distinguish a TLS failure from an application one, and what to do the
day the firmware learns the new roots.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
The rolling twelve-month window is fetched from openholidaysapi.org each
night at 03:00 local, and can be triggered from the page, from
POST /api/admin/holidays/sync, or from `npm run holidays:sync` for the
first run after a deployment.
The calendar is fetched twice, once per language, and the two answers
joined on the entry id. Holiday names are proper nouns with established
English forms — "Jeûne genevois" is not something a translation model
should be improvising, and this costs one extra HTTP call.
Two properties are load-bearing and tested against a real database.
The sync is idempotent: running it twice leaves exactly what running it
once did, verified live as well as against a mock. And it never touches
`isAutoClosed` on an existing row — that is the shop's decision, not the
API's, and a nightly job quietly reopening a day the owner had closed
would be invisible until someone found the door locked.
When the API is down the local cache is left untouched and the failure
is recorded with its timestamp, so the page can say how stale the
calendar is rather than showing nothing. Retries widen the gap between
attempts; the nightly job can afford to wait, the shop cannot afford a
stale calendar for a day.
node-cron runs inside the application process rather than an external
cron hitting an endpoint: one container, one shop, no second instance to
coordinate with, and no trigger endpoint to protect and document. The
reasoning is recorded next to the schedule.
Verified against the live API: nine Geneva holidays, both languages,
including the cantonal Restauration de la République.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
French in, English out, with the character counter tied to the same
constant the renderer uses — so the warning and the space actually
available on the panel cannot drift apart.
Translation is a second call, not part of the save. A slow or broken
service must never cost the shop its message: the row is stored first
and marked pending, the translation follows, and a failure shows as a
badge with a retry rather than as a lost notice.
The status transitions are the subtle part and are pinned by tests.
Editing the French clears the English, including a translation someone
had corrected by hand — a translation of text that has changed is worse
than no translation. Editing only the dates or the priority leaves it
alone. A hand-written translation is never overwritten while its French
stands, and emptying it returns the row to pending.
"On the screen" is decided by the same selector the renderer uses, so
the badge cannot disagree with the panel about which message is live.
The preview is served by the device's own pipeline — payload, SVG,
threshold — so what the admin sees is the shop window down to the last
thresholded pixel. A preview drawn any other way would eventually
disagree with reality, quietly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
Sign-in goes through Authentik over OIDC with PKCE. Verified against the
live provider: the discovery issuer matches the configured one exactly,
and the authorize redirect carries code_challenge_method=S256.
Sessions are JWTs with no database adapter, which keeps the module
usable from edge middleware and makes a sign-in cost no query. The
trade-off is stated in the code: the role travels in the token, so
removing someone from the admin group takes effect at the next sign-in
or when the eight-hour session expires, not instantly. Immediate
revocation would mean asking Authentik on every request, which is what
api_llm_loxi does and what this application deliberately does not — it
drives a shop window, not a fleet.
Group matching is trimmed and case-insensitive. Authentik group names
are case-sensitive, but a capitalisation mismatch between the group and
the environment variable locks the shop owner out silently, and that is
the worse of the two failures. An empty variable never promotes anyone.
Authorisation is enforced twice. The middleware covers every /admin page
and /api/admin route at the edge; a guard inside the handlers repeats
the check, because a matcher is a string, strings get edited, and a
route falling outside one should not be the same thing as a route with
no access control. The rule itself lives in its own framework-free
module so it can be tested directly. Unknown HTTP verbs count as writes:
new methods arrive locked.
Pages get a redirect to the sign-in screen, API routes get a status
code — a fetch that receives an HTML login page is a confusing way to
learn you are signed out. The device API stays outside the matcher, as
the panel cannot sign in and carries its own bearer token; this is
covered by a check that /api/display still answers 401 rather than
redirecting.
The audit diff compares values by their JSON form, so slot arrays and
dates compare by value rather than identity, and a save that changed
nothing writes no entry. Recording never throws: losing the trail is
bad, refusing the user's change because the trail could not be written
is worse.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
The panel now pairs, fetches its image and files its logs against this
application rather than against the TRMNL cloud.
Four endpoints: /api/setup issues a token on first contact,
/api/display hands back an image and a wake interval, /api/log stores
firmware diagnostics, and /api/device/image/<hash> serves the bytes.
The wake interval is where freshness and battery are traded off. In BYOS
nothing can be pushed: the device sleeps, wakes, asks and sleeps again.
So the interval is short while the shop trades and long overnight, and
it is shortened further whenever a change of state falls inside it —
the door opening in twenty minutes means waking in twenty-one,
whatever the base interval says.
The image filename is the hash of its own bytes. The firmware skips the
redraw when the name is unchanged, which is the whole battery strategy,
and the URL is immutable, unguessable and safe to cache forever. Two
integration tests pin this: unchanged data must yield the same filename
and store one row, changed hours must yield a different one.
MAC addresses are normalised before use. They are a primary key here,
and firmwares are inconsistent about case and separators; without this a
panel could register twice by capitalising itself differently. Header
names are read in both the hyphen and underscore spellings for the same
reason — the TRMNL docs and the Seeed sources disagree, and being
liberal costs nothing while being wrong costs a blank shop window.
Pairing is deliberately made to survive a rendering failure. The token
is issued once and only its digest is kept, so a device stranded by a
failed response would be registered yet hold no credential, and unable
to register again. The welcome image is worth far less than that. This
was found by running the flow, not by reading it.
satori, yoga and harfbuzz are marked external: bundling rewrites the
relative path satori uses to load its WebAssembly, and the renderer dies
on a missing hb.wasm.
The integration tests run against a real Postgres, in CI too. Mocking
Prisma here would only prove the mock works.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
Set up the project skeleton for the ITA ITO opening-hours display admin:
Next.js 16 (App Router) with TypeScript in strict mode, Tailwind CSS 4,
Vitest, ESLint and a blocking CI workflow.
The design tokens are copied verbatim from the model_ita_ito project
(palette, Inter Variable + Source Serif 4, radii, dark theme) so the two
applications look like one family, as required by the spec.
ESLint is pinned to v9: eslint-config-next bundles a react plugin that
crashes on ESLint 10. The typed `consistent-type-imports` rule is left
out because `verbatimModuleSyntax` already enforces the same discipline
at compile time, without the cost of typed linting across the repo.
PLAN.md records the agreed architecture, including the decisions that
depart from the original spec — most importantly the move from BYOD to
a self-hosted BYOS server, which removes the TRMNL private plugin, the
Liquid template and the webhook entirely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012cSY9pVhZmJUKNN7wf1Myd
vliaudatandClaude Opus 5